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Since the end of World War II, our Constitutional law of criminal sentencing has veered 
from judicial sentencing supremacy to legislative domination and back again.  In 1949, the Court 
gave us a paean to judicial sentencing discretion, Williams v. New York..1  In the mid 1970s it 
began to develop a set of doctrines that abetted the construction of a legislative straitjacket on 
judicial sentencing power.  Turning rather suddenly after more than 20 years on the road of 
legislative dominance, the Court cut those ties, freeing judges to sentence as they may and 
rejecting the most important set of legislative sentencing reforms of the last century in a set of 
cases culminating with Booker v. United States.2  Viewed as cases regulating sentencing, it is 
hard to see a consistent logical thread running through these cases.  But ours is a criminal justice 
*
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1337 U.S. 241 (1949) (affirming judicial imposition of a death sentence based on 
evidence not presented to the jury and found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence). 
2125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (excising the portions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that 
made them binding to remedy a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
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system of fragmented power and indirect regulation, in which cases about one thing may really 
be directed at quite another.  
For example, we regulate the jury trial right not so much to control the rare jury trial, but 
more to influence the balance of forces that will determine the negotiated pleas that will resolve 
most cases.3  Although doctrine is an important constraint, our criminal justice system retains the 
distinctive Anglo-American preference for a high degree of indirect regulation of relatively 
unconstrained individual official actors with competing spheres of authority.4  The criminal law, 
3Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463 (2004) (arguing that structural influences and psychological factors make the results of the 
current plea bargaining regime diverge dramatically from those that would be achieved under a 
system in which trials predominated or under a system of reformed plea bargaining system); 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2548 (2004) (arguing that as the criminal law expands, it imposes fewer constraints on plea 
bargains).
The Supreme Court has recognized that regulation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial  
shifts the allocation of power among prosecutors, judges and defendants, changing the dynamics 
of plea bargaining.  However, while the majority and dissenters agree that power shifts as the 
contours of the trial right change, they disagree on who will gain power, who will lose power and 
whether the shifts will help or harm most defendants.  Washington v. Blakely, 125 S.Ct. 21 
(2004).
Of course, the details of the Sixth Amendment right also matters a great deal to those 
defendants who choose to go to trial.  The changes in sentencing law and procedure discussed in 
this article have also diminished the power of the juries in the cases they decide.  Rachel E. 
Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory 
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33 (2003) (arguing that mandatory sentencing regimes have 
diminished the power of the criminal jury). 
4Professor Daniel C. Richman has noted the tendency to checks and balances even within 
the law enforcement establishment itself.  “After all, the entire American criminal justice system 
is characterized by an almost instinctive embrace of fragmented authority, with the tensions 
between police and prosecutors, attorneys general and district attorneys seen as a virtue, rather 
than a vice.”  Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and 
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 807 (1999) (arguing that Congress exercises 
greater control over federal law enforcement through funding, oversight hearings and other 
bureaucratic mechanisms than by limiting or tailoring substantive statutes, but these controls 
only work in some areas of enforcement and tend to be motivated less by policy preferences and 
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which is arguably our most public exercise of legal power, retains a strong flavor of market style 
regulation.  Public actors, such as prosecutors and judges, exercise public authority while 
retaining a significant degree of individual discretion through doctrines of non-review5 or review 
under standards which insulate all but the most outrageous decisions from reversal.6
This paper argues that the modern sentencing procedure cases make more sense when  
understood as the Court’s best effort to maintain balance among judges, prosecutors and 
legislators in the face of changing political and social conditions.  Although the cases regulate 
sentencing, they use sentencing as a means to a larger end as they address narrower doctrinal 
questions.  The line of cases from Williams to Booker do not chart a steady course or create 
more by the desire to curb executive power).
5Prosecutorial decisions about when or what to charge are virtually unreviewable.  The 
Supreme Court has noted that in the ordinary case, "so long as the prosecutor has probable cause 
to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not 
to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his 
discretion."  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (holding that although petitioner 
was originally indicted for uttering a forged instrument, due process was not violated when, 
during the course of plea negotiations, the prosecutor threatened to seek an indictment under 
Habitual Criminal Act if petitioner did not plead guilty to the forged instrument charge).  See 
also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996) (holding that discovery on a selective 
prosecution claim is only required after a threshold showing that others of a different race who 
were otherwise similarly situated were not prosecuted).  For the American historical background 
of prosecutorial discretion, see, Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public" 
Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, (2002) (arguing that the shift 
from private to public prosecutors was driven by a desire to make crime control more efficient, 
not to exercise greater public control and make the criminal law more accountable to law).
6
 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ regime, for example, departure review under 
the abuse of discretion standard insulated trial judges in many circuits from reversal, freeing 
them to push the boundaries of the law.  See Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of 
Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion under 
the Guidelines, 79 B.U.L. REV. 493 (1999) (finding that some of the circuits reversed virtually 
no district court departures under the abuse of discretion standard).  Many question whether 
reasonableness review in the current regime will have any teeth.
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optimal sentencing doctrines; they indirectly regulate the entire criminal justice system as they 
directly address sentencing.  
The big issue behind these cases is the allocation of authority in American criminal law 
among trial judges, appellate judges, prosecutors and legislators.  In the late 1970s, at a time 
when the sphere of legislative action in the criminal area seemed well defined by practice, the 
Court curtailed judicial review of the legislature’s power to define crimes and set punishments.  
It was safer to give power to bodies that seemed disinclined to use it aggressively than to trust 
power to judges who appeared inclined to use it.  But by the late 1990s, legislators had clearly 
demonstrated their willingness to exercise their power over criminal justice issues at the limits 
the Court had set for them.  They also made it clear that they had come to understand that their 
interests were strongly tied to those of prosecutors, and both branches gained power as judges 
lost it.7  So, as the public clamor for severe penal laws began to abate a little, the Court began to 
push back in the late 1990s.  In an effort to rebalance the system, the Court reallocated power 
7Congress and many state legislatures have used their greater power to define crimes and 
punishments to transfer power from judges to prosecutors by passing mandatory minimum 
sentencing statutes and other kinds of detailed criminal provisions that strengthen the 
prosecutor’s position in plea bargaining. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. Rev. 505, 537-40 (2001) (discussing how overcriminalization 
expands prosecutorial power and noting the alliance that developed between legislators and 
prosecutors in the late 20th Century);  Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing 
Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics 
Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 108-12 (2003) (offering an example of how the addition 
of new, more specific federal narcotics crimes and changes in sentencing law shifted power to 
prosecutors in the period from 1985 to 2000).  But even the relationship between the adoption of 
detailed criminal statutes and increased prosecutorial power depends upon and can be altered by 
changes in a variety of sentencing procedures.  Thus, all things being equal, greater statutory 
specificity increases prosecutorial bargaining leverage, except where judges retain broad 
sentencing discretion, where statutory sentencing ranges have significant overlap, where 
caseload pressure and local culture result in lenient plea offers or where any number of other 
factors may counterbalance the impact of greater statutory specificity.  It is a complex and 
uncertain business in which all things are rarely equal.
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from the legislators and prosecutors to the judges.  It bears noting that the current arrangements 
may be overturned by Congress and the state legislatures affected by these changes.  It remains 
to be seen whether we are at, or will come to, a period of stability in our sentencing law and 
practices. 
I. The Historical, Doctrinal and Practice Context of Our Constitutional Sentencing Law
There was much less criminal law in America fifty years ago. There were fewer criminal 
statutes and they were generally shorter, simpler and less specific than many recent enactments.   
Statutes tended to codify the long standing common law definitions of crimes and within that 
tradition, states were free to criminalize conduct as each saw fit.  Criminal procedure law was 
generally found in the cases, not statutes.  It was less technically demanding and not yet
constitutionalized.  Beyond the most basic procedural requirements, such as jury trials for 
felonies, states enforced their laws in a variety of ways with very little oversight or intervention 
by courts or legislatures.8
American criminal law has grown larger and more complex in the last fifty years and its 
focus has shifted toward procedure.   There has been a great wave of re-codification.  Many state 
systems have moved far from the common law tradition and significantly towards  more detailed 
8Of course, it can also be said that there was much more criminal law in America in 1949 
than there was in 1900.  The rise of national markets, the emergence of the Progressive era proto 
regulatory state, the New Deal and most importantly, Prohibition, all sparked waves of new 
criminal statutes, new enforcement techniques and expansion of the federal role in criminal law 
and criminal enforcement.  Waves of federalization of criminal law have characterized American 
criminal justice since the Fugitive Slave Act and the Civil War caused the first stirrings of the 
idea of a national American criminal law.
-6- 
and specific criminal statutes.9  As the Supreme Court has constitutionalized criminal procedure, 
federal law enforcement and federal adjudication of criminal cases has grown tremendously.10
Along with a new level of complexity, we have greater national consistency in our criminal law 
and practice than we had in 1955.  Yet, great variation in substantive law, procedure and practice 
remains a signal feature of American criminal law, given the diverse systems in place in the fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, the federal and the military courts.11
Along with all of the variation, there are also unifying themes in American criminal 
justice. From the end of World War II through about 1980, the everyday practice of criminal law 
in American courts was strongly influenced by the rehabilitative12 theory of punishment,13 and 
9See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 505, 515-20 (2001) (describing the growth of criminal law in America). 
10See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To Do With It?  The Political, Social, 
Psychological And Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing The Development Of (Federal) 
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. Rev. 23 (1997) (examining whether the politicizing of crime 
causing an emphasis on harsher sentences is the right direction for this country).  
11Looking across the varied landscape of American criminal justice, one can find current 
examples of criminal sentencing in America that are characterized by unfettered judicial 
discretion, complete legislative control through mandatory sentencing, jury sentencing or 
enforceable guideline sentencing, as well as a range of combinations of each variety of 
sentencing.   Perhaps more importantly, very few of these doctrines address, and none control, 
the process of plea bargaining, through which we resolve the vast bulk of criminal cases.  
Finding guiding historical principles and developing and enforcing useful general rules for this 
wide variety of doctrines and practices is a central problem in American sentencing law.  Even if 
we had useful general principles, we would still find ourselves committed to an odd sort of semi-
regulated marketplace at the core of the whole enterprise.
12The rehabilitative, or correctionalist, theory aims to reform the criminal so that he or 
she will not reoffend.  For an early European proponent of rehabilitation, see CESARE BECCARIA, 
ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, first published in 1764.  The rehabilitative movement took root in 
Victorian England and soon came to America.  See NORVAL MORRIS AND DAVID J. ROTHMAN, 
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 
(1995).  In Michael Foucault’s book, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON, (1997) 
he offers the classic theoretical treatment of the deep social roots of the rehabilitative idea in the 
development of modern society.  For a trenchant application of Foucault’s ideas to American 
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the doctrines and practices furthering that goal in a concrete way.14  This story begins early in 
that era, with Williams v. New York, a 1949 case that affirmed the power of sentencing judges to 
consider a wide range of evidence and use informal procedures at sentencing.  These very 
flexible procedures made sense in the era of rehabilitative sentencing when judges imposed 
indeterminate terms for the purpose of reforming the individual who stood before the court.  
Every sentence was a fresh creative and interpretative act with the goal of finding the correct 
approach to this unique defendant and his or her problems and challenges.  
Also, from the mid 1950s through the late 1970s, the American justice system made an 
effort to bring the whole nation, particularly the South, into the modern era by ending 
institutionalized racism and moderating excessive punishment through court driven procedural 
reform.  Legislative interest in criminal law focused upon the substantive criminal law, as many 
states participated in the great wave of Model Penal Code inspired re-codification.15  The 
criminal justice since World War II, see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001).
13Professor Douglas Berman has insightfully argued that these cases must be understood 
in light of the shift from rehabilitation to retribution as the dominant justification for criminal 
sanction. Douglas A. Berman, The Roots and Realities of Blakely, 19 CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 5 (2005). 
14For a description of how the shift from the rehabilitative ideal and unfettered judicial 
sentencing discretion to a system of retributive sentencing using enforceable sentencing 
guidelines dramatically changed the power dynamics among judges, prosecutors and defense 
lawyers and radically shifted the day to day practice of criminal law, see Weinstein, Fifteen 
Years after the Revolution, supra note 7 at 101.
15Herbert Wechsler, Forward to Model Penal Code and Commentaries at xi (The 
American Law Institute 1985) (noting that by 1982, 20 years after the introduction of the Model 
Penal Code in 1962, more than two thirds of the states had recodified their criminal laws using 
the Model Penal Code as a starting point).  Congress joined the effort, but was unable to agree on 
a recodification of the Federal Criminal Code, which retains many older common law based 
statutes, despite having swelled with a plethora of more modern additions.  See Gerard E. Lynch 
Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part 2 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. Rev. 297, 315-16 (1998).                                                     
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legislative focus on rehabilitative sentencing and implementing the substantive criminal law 
provisions of the Model Penal Code was consistent with both the rehabilitative ideal,16 and the 
Supreme Court driven constitutionalization of criminal procedure law in investigation and 
adjudication.17
The strains in our continued devotion to both rehabilitation and the procedural revolution 
were evident by the early 1970s, but criticism of both trends became dominant by the mid 1980s.  
As David Garland has argued so trenchantly, during this period, a real rise in crime rates caused 
by changes in both family and work life coupled with the political upheavals of the late 1960s 
and changes in the way the media covered crime combined to re-politicize crime in America.18
By the mid 1970s, crime was on the agenda of most politicians and it had become standard fare 
16The drafters of the Model Penal Code were strongly influenced by psychological ideas
quite sympathetic to the rehabilitative ideal.  My colleague, Professor Deborah Denno, has 
explored their strong Freudian bent.  See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science 
and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269 (2002).  I am not arguing that only Freudian 
pscychology is consistent with rehabilitation, but rather that like many other thinkers of that 
period, Wechsler and others were strongly influenced by psychology in their thinking about both 
substantive criminal law and penal theory.  This approach lends itself to treating crime as a 
pathology that may be cured, as opposed, for example, to an approach influenced more by 
economics, consequently viewing crime as an undesirable behavior to which a significant cost 
should be attached. 
17In addition to their shared intellectual roots in Post World War II American modernism, 
these trends fit together in a functional way.  They permitted the different criminal justice actors 
to focused on their own realms.  Thus, legislatures focused on the substantive law of crimes in 
this period and, following the lead of the Model Penal Code drafters, did not address the law of 
sentencing or sentencing procedures to any significant degree.  Trial judges, particularly in the 
federal system, exercised virtually unreviewable authority over sentencing, while the appellate 
courts focused on regulating investigation and adjudication.  The executive, which was 
beginning to appreciate the possibilities of an expanded enforcement regime by the end of this 
period, continued to roam the wide field defined by the expansive Anglo-American principle of 
prosecutorial discretion.  
18DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, Chapter 4 (University of Chicago Press 2001).  See also Rachel E. 
Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, n. 94 (2005).
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to criticize the courts for coddling criminals and letting them go on “technicalities.”  The 
rehabilitative ideal, an idea that had dominated penal theory for many years, collapsed 
suddenly.19  America was well on its to what has become widely recognized as the politicization 
of crime and the one way ratchet in which criminal justice legislation only begets more penal law 
imposing even harsher sentences.20
The shift from the era of rehabilitation and relatively less political focus on crime to the 
era of retributivism,21 or modified just deserts22 and keen political interest in criminal justice 
provides the contextual key to understanding the Supreme Court’s dramatic doctrinal shifts on 
the permissible scope of judicially imposed limits on legislative drafting of criminal statutes.  By 
19Id. at Chapter 3 (describing and analyzing the sudden collapse of the rehabilitative ideal 
in the late 1970s).  
20See Beale, supra note 10. 
21Retributivism, or just deserts, holds that moral blameworthiness is a sufficient 
justification for punishment, aside from any consequentialist justification.  It has an ancient 
lineage, often traced back to the Biblical ‘eye for an eye,’ formula.  Immanuel Kant offered a 
retributivist justification of the criminal sanction in The Philosophy of Law.  An outstanding 
contemporary work on retributivism and related ideas is JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, 
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (Cambridge University Press 1990).
22Modified just deserts is a theory of punishment that views retributivism through the lens 
of proportionality and tempers it with a strong dose of specific deterrence or incapacitation.  
Thus, it views moral blameworthiness as the prime reason for punishment, emphasizes escalating 
punishment as the offender’s conduct grows more blameworthy and gives relatively great weight 
to the likelihood that a particular offender will re-offend as a sufficient reason to increase 
punishment.  It subordinates considerations of rehabilitation and general deterrence in 
sentencing.  It is the theory that best explains the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  See Paul J. 
Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 51-54 (2003).  More broadly, 
modified just deserts is quite congenial to the social forces that have moved toward more severe 
criminal sanctions over the past 25 years.  See generally, Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous 
Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 
(2000); Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity Revolution, 56 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 217 (2001). 
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the time one of the central and most cited cases in this line, Pennsylvania v. McMillan, came to 
the Court in 1986, much had changed from the era of Williams.  America had experienced a real 
rise in serious crime over the 20 years from 1960 to 1980.  Crime had become an issue on every 
politician’s agenda; the rehabilitative model had been replaced by a punitive form of 
retributivism23; and a larger political realignment had empowered critics of the old school of 
criminal justice.  Almost nothing could be heard over the full throated political roar favoring 
harsher sentences.  At the same time, but for different political reasons,  the imperial federal 
judiciary of the 60s and 70s was under political attack and majoritarianism was on the rise.  In 
the midst of what seemed like a broad political consensus, the Court went down the road of 
unfettered legislative discretion to define crimes with almost no judicial oversight.
Of course, the re-emergence of crime as a hot button political issue was just one piece of 
a larger dynamic of shifting intellectual, sociological and economic forces during the second half 
of the twentieth century.  Changing patterns of criminality driven by new social patterns and  
urbanization,24 the civil rights struggle, America’s shifting religious landscape and more 
23
 Increasing sentence severity became an explicit goal of the sentencing reform 
movement. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 284-87 (1993).
Federal sentences grew much harsher in the early 1990s as the Guidelines and a range of 
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes took hold.  See Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, 
Examining Changes in Federal Sentencing Severity: 1980-1998, 10 FED. SENT. R. 12 (1999).  
Many states made similar legal changes starting in the mid 80s and experienced similar 
sentencing trends from the late 80s through the late 90s.  For a definitive analysis of these trends 
in federal narcotics sentencing, which accounts for 40% of the federal criminal docket and is at 
the core of many of the changes in American criminal law over the past 30 years, see Frank 
Bowman and Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal 
Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477 (2002). 
24See Garland, supra note 18 at 162.
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recently, changes in policing strategies25 and technology,26 as well as the rise of terrorism as a 
defining security and criminal law issue of our time,27 have all shaped our current attitudes 
toward criminal justice.  In broad stroke, the criminal law and criminal procedure doctrines I 
examine here were buffeted by a real rise and then fall in crime,28 a significant shift in ideas of 
25The best known example of this new style of policing, sometimes called ‘public order 
policing,’ is often associated with the Broken Windows theory first put forward by James Q. 
Wilson.  The theory emphasizes vigorous enforcement of minor offenses. James Q. Wilson & 
George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.  New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton adopted 
Wilson and Kelling’s Broken Windows’ thesis as the basis for the city’s new policing initiative 
in 1994. CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE DEP’T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC 
SPACES OF NEW YORK (1994) (setting forth the New York City Police Department’s strategy for 
improving disorderly conditions); see also William J. Bratton, Policy Review: The New York City 
Police Department’s Civil Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J. L. & POL’Y 447, 447-51 
(1995).  As practiced by Bratton, head of New York’s Transit Police, Mayor Giuliani's Police 
Commissioner and now the head of the Los Angeles Police Department, this style of policing 
includes: (1) an evidence based or data driven strategy (i.e. extensive use of information 
technology to identify crimes patterns and develop statistically driven assessments of police 
techniques); (2) a high contact strategy (in which the police seek to interact with as many minor 
offenders as possible to maximize the number of searches and warrant checks performed); and 
(3) flooding the zone (saturation policing which involves using the statistics generated by 
information technology to target particular neighborhoods for intensive police activity). The link 
between aggressive enforcement of minor offenses in targeted neighborhoods and a decrease in 
crime is far from clear, but the decrease in crime appears real.  See Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the 
Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
291, 293-93, 377-81 (1998); Ana Joanes, Does the New York City Police Department Deserve 
Credit for the Decline in New York City’s Homicide Rates?  A Cross-City Comparison of 
Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 274-81 (2000).
26See Garland, supra note 18 at 160-63.
27See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005) (arguing that the 
rise of terrorism as a criminal justice concern creates new incentives for prosecutors to use the  
problematic tool of pretextual prosecution).
28Although, perceptions of crime continued to rise.  See Beale, supra note 10 at 47-54.  
As well, salient events like the crack epidemic of the late 80s continued to feed the perception of 
spiraling disorder.
-12-
personal responsibility, a cycling of power away from and perhaps back to courts, and the 
emergence of new threats and new methods of detection, enforcement and proof.
As is often the case, society began to change before politicians or the law recognized it.   
As people began to adjust to falling crime rates, new technology and old political concerns 
whetted the public appetite for stories of wrongful convictions and police misconduct.  In the 
shifting criminal justice sands of the turn of the 21st Century, the Court seized the opportunity to 
push back against legislative dominance in the criminal arena, motivated by a combination of 
institutional imperative, congruent individual views on how the Constitution should be read29
and perhaps the view that severity had gone too far.  It did not make for pellucid doctrine, but it 
is an example of how we regulate American criminal justice by recalibrating the relationships 
among the several players who share and balance power in our criminal justice system.  
II. The Modern Jurisprudence Begins with Williams v. New York and Broad Judicial               
Discretion
The modern American constitutional procedural law of sentencing30 begins with 
29Perhaps this is only an obscure way of saying that there is no really satisfying 
explanation for how Justice Scalia came round to a position for which Justice Stevens had long 
argued. 
30The Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence has been largely procedural.  
Substantive appellate review of federal sentencing did not exist before the Sentencing Reform 
Act and the Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); 
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974).  The development of the doctrine of non-
reviewability and its weakening through increasing procedural scrutiny of federal sentencing by 
courts of appeal is discussed in Robert J. Kutak and J. Michael Gottschalk, In Search of a 
Rational Sentence: A Return to the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463 (1974)
(demonstrating convincingly that courts of appeal occasionally used procedural dress to remand 
egregious sentences, but arguing for appellate review because the doctrine of non-reviewability 
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Williams v. New York,31 a case that clearly captures the post World War II faith in expertise and 
the power of psychology and social work.  The Supreme Court’s first look at sentencing in the 
modern era reflects the solid grasp of rehabilitation as the dominant penal theory of this period.
Samuel Williams was convicted of murder.  The jury recommended a sentence of life in 
prison.  The trial judge sentenced him to death, relying upon facts contained in a pre-sentence 
report.  The defendant argued that he was entitled to confront the witnesses against him at the 
sentencing hearing, but the Supreme Court upheld the sentence.  The Court ruled that the 
defendant’s sentencing was properly governed by much more relaxed rules of procedure than 
those governing trial.  The Court drew a bright line rule between the jury role in adjudicating 
guilt or innocence and the judicial role in fashioning an individualized sentence in the era of 
indeterminate, rehabilitative sentencing.  
Although Williams is no longer good death penalty law, it is still cited for the proposition 
that there is a well settled American legal practice history of sentencing judges exercising 
discretion about both the mechanics of sentencing and the nature of the sentence imposed.32  The 
prevented the development of sentencing standards).  Although the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines offered an opportunity for the Court to develop a substantive law of sentencing, its 
shrinking docket did not address those issues, displaying a continued preference for procedural 
cases such as Koon.  
More fundamentally, a very weak doctrine of proportionality review is a rejection of the 
most likely Constitutional basis for broad, substantive regulation of criminal sentencing and 
undergirds the significant authority Congress and each state legislature maintains over the 
substantive law of sentencing.  See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Ewing v. California, 
538 U.S. 11 (2003) (rejecting a challenge to California’s three strikes law.  A current and very 
useful reassessment of this area is, Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive 
Punishment, 91 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming May 2005).     
31 See Williams, supra note 1.
32Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (noting that “judges in this country 
have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the 
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Supreme Court endorsed a flexible set of sentencing procedures in Williams, noting that the 
ultimate aim was for the judge to impose a proper, individualized sentence that would promote 
rehabilitation.  That goal, seen through the lens of the reigning psychological and social service 
understanding of the day, was inherently individualistic.  The judge needed to understand enough 
about this individual to impose a sentence that held out the hope of reforming him or her.   This 
is not a sentencing regime built primarily upon concerns about uniformity and retribution.33
The Williams Court reminded us that sentencing procedures would remain subject to due 
process scrutiny, citing Townsend v. Burke.34  However, the egregious facts of  Townsend, 
involving an obvious factual mistake by the sentencing judge in a case involving an uncounseled 
defendant, suggest just how undemanding that scrutiny would be.  Williams and its progeny, 
including Brady v. Maryland,35 and United States v. Grayson,36  established that individualized, 
individual case”).  See, e.g., Williams, 337 U.S. at 246 (discussing that "[b]oth before and since 
the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy 
under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of 
evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed 
within limits fixed by law”).
33In the American view of rehabilitative sentencing, the judge must figure out how to 
shape the sentence to address the particular psychological and social issues that lead this 
individual to make bad choices.  Although this is a strong and longstanding connection in our 
law and reflects our criminal law’s deep commitment to individual will and autonomy, it is a 
connection contingent upon our particular view of autonomy and choice.  Rehabilitation may be 
very differently conceived.  Political reeducation, as practiced by other regimes, suggests how 
rehabilitation can be understood as a standardized group practice rather than an individualized 
one.
34
 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (granting relief to an un-counseled defendant whose sentence was 
enhanced based on the sentencing court’s erroneous belief that the defendant had been convicted 
of certain offenses, when in fact it was the defendant’s brother who had been convicted of those 
crimes).
35373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory material to the 
defense).
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rehabilitative sentencing was governed by much less demanding procedural requirements than 
trial.
Williams reflected the longstanding understanding of the division of authority between 
the judge and jury.  The line between guilt and innocence remained the province of the jury, with 
all of the strong procedural protections afforded by the Constitution.  Once a defendant was 
found guilty, punishment was generally the province of the judge.37  The key was, and remains, 
drawing the line at which the Sixth Amendment jury trial right attaches, along with the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The contours of the procedural rights due at 
sentencing have long been anchored at the line between the elements of the offense,38 which 
must go to the jury, and other factors relevant to sentencing, which need not be adjudicated by 
the jury and may be determined in a less formal procedure.   
III.  The Central Question Emerges in Mullaney and Patterson: What is an Element? 
In the modern era of criminal jurisprudence, the Supreme Court began to draw the line 
between the demanding Sixth Amendment jury trial right and the less demanding Due Process 
36
 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (affirming a sentence enhanced by a judicial finding that the 
defendant had lied during his trial testimony).
37While this had long been true in England, the federal system and much of America, 
some American states have long used jury sentencing.  See generally Jenia Iontcheva, Jury 
Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311 (2003) (noting that six states employ 
jury sentencing in non-capital cases and arguing for its expansion in light of Apprendi). 
38For an outstanding current discussion of the history and difficulties of the elements test, 
see Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty 
Pleas, 110 YALE L. J. 1097 (2001) (arguing that the strong form of the elements test adopted by 
the Supreme Court has weak historical roots, that the rules are responsive to problems that 
modern criminal law no longer faces, and that the elements test does not address the issues 
presented by our plea bargaining regime).  
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right to a fair sentencing procedure in Mullaney v. Wilbur,39 and Patterson v. New York.40  This 
very important and hard to reconcile pair of cases examines what consequences flow from the 
broad state power, exercised primarily by the legislature, to define crimes and determine the 
punishment attendant upon conviction.  Although neither case involves a direct challenge to a 
sentence or sentencing procedure, in our system of indirect regulation of the dominant guilty plea 
regime, the cases loom large in the sentencing landscape. 
In Mullaney, the Court affirmed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus to Stillman E. 
Wilbur, Jr., who had been convicted of first degree murder in Maine.  Maine’s common law 
based first degree murder statute included the traditional mens rea requirement of malice 
aforethought.41  The wrinkle in Maine law was that for many years, proof of an intentional, 
unlawful killing gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of malice aforethought.  Once the 
presumption was invoked, the defendant could then prove, by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence, that he acted on sudden provocation, which reduced the crime to manslaughter.42
Relying on In Re Winship,43 the Court focused on the historical significance of the line between 
murder and manslaughter and  held that the state must bear the burden of proof, and prove 
39421 U.S. 684 (1975).
40
 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
41Malice aforethought is the term of art for the mens rea required for murder under the 
common law.  Generally, malice aforethought includes all killings that i) were intentional, ii) 
resulted from acts done with the intent to inflict grievous bodily injury, iii) resulted from acts 
done with extremely reckless disregard for human life, or iv) resulted from the commission of, or 
from the flight from, a felony.  See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
LAW §32.01 (Lexis Publishing 2001).  
42Heat of passion, or passion and provocation, is the common law doctrine that reduces 
murder to manslaughter if the defendant acted in the heat of passion resulting from adequate 
provocation without a sufficient lapse of time for the passion to cool.  Id. at §31.07[B][1].
43397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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beyond a reasonable doubt the issue of the absence of provocation.  
Although Mullaney struck a blow against unfettered state power to define crimes, this 
opening salvo, in what became a lengthy and complex campaign, was very carefully aimed.   The 
defendant initially challenged his conviction in the Maine state courts, arguing that the statute 
created two separate crimes, with separate elements that must be proven by the prosecution.  The 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the statute created only one crime, felonious homicide, 
with two different degrees.  The lower federal courts44 disagreed with the State Court’s reading 
of the Maine statute and adopted the petitioner’s two crimes approach.  The United States 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ result, but rejected their reinterpretation of Maine 
law.45
The Court ruled that the state courts are ultimate expositors of state law,46 and accepted 
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s view that the Maine statute created one crime, with two 
distinct degrees.    The Court went on to frame the issue in terms of the burden of proof, 
questioning whether “the Maine rule requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of 
44 See Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F.Supp. 149 (S.D. Me. 1972); Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 
F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973).
45421 U.S. 684 (1975).  The picture was a bit more complex.  After this case was decided 
by the First Circuit, the Maine Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that the Maine statute created 
only one crime with two different degrees and sharply criticized the First Circuit’s view of state 
law, State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973).  After Lafferty was decided, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted cert in Mullaney v. Wilbur and remanded it to the First Circuit for reconsideration 
in light of Lafferty.  The First Circuit then accepted the Maine Court’s interpretation of Maine 
law, reaffirmed the grant of the writ, this time relying on Winship.  It then ruled, as the Supreme 
Court would have, that the prosecution had to bear the burden of proof on the issue of the 
nonexistence of mitigating provocation once that issue was fairly raised by the defense.
46421 U.S. at 691.
-18-
passion on sudden provocation accords with due process.”47  This framing of the question 
reminds us why Mullaney is a beloved evidence case, one of the few High Court opinions that 
discusses presumptions in criminal cases, a subject left unaddressed by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.48   It also highlights how careful the Court was, and remains, in finding a balance 
among issues of federalism, separation of powers and fundamental fairness in criminal cases.  
The Court offered a two step analysis of this procedurally framed question.  Beginning 
with the substantive law, the Court reviewed the history of the murder/manslaughter distinction 
in common law.  It found mitigating provocation “the most important factor in determining the 
degree of culpability attaching to unlawful homicide,”49 and a clear trend of requiring the 
prosecution to bear the burden on that fact.  That analysis would have permitted the Court to 
answer the procedural  question of Mullaney with this historically based analysis of the 
substantive question.  The Court might have simply said that when the substantive law has 
historically defined the particular fact at issue as the most important factor determining the 
severity of the offense, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  But the Court did not stop 
there.
The second step of the analysis then responded to a limiting argument that this historical 
analysis opened; even if this history was right, Winship still did not require invalidating the 
Maine scheme because the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt only applies to facts 
which would wholly exonerate the defendant.  On this analysis, the question of guilt or 
47Id. at 692.
48Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence only addresses presumptions in civil cases.  
Congress rejected proposed Rule 303, which addressed presumptions in criminal cases.cite
49421 U.S. at 696.
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innocence is completely divorced from the question of degree of culpability.  The suggestion was 
that the magnitude of being convicted of any crime, and so being stigmatized as a criminal, is so 
grave that the full panoply of rights must attach to that decision.  On this argument, once a 
person is convicted, the issue of the degree of their criminal culpability is of so much less 
significance that fewer procedural rights should attach to that determination.  
Mullaney decisively rejected that argument, although it is one that soon reemerged and 
loomed large in late 20th Century sentencing.  The Mullaney Court’s rejection of a bright line 
between criminal liability and degree of culpability speaks to both the substantive law and the 
procedural understanding necessary to vindicate that substantive principle.  The substantive 
criminal law point was that Anglo American criminal law takes both the guilt or innocence 
finding and the determination of the degree of culpability quite seriously.  Our substantive law 
has long carefully defined crimes and ranked them; it has never simply created one broad 
category of malefactor and lumped all wrongdoers in together.50
The Court next reminded us that a procedural question, like the assignment of burdens, 
must not be allowed to swallow the substantive law principle, but rather must be interpreted to 
protect it.  As the Court noted, if Winship were not found to limit Maine law in this case, “a State 
could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect . . . redef[ining] the 
elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the 
extent of punishment.”51
50Although, the indeterminate sentencing of the middle of the 20th Century and the 
sentencing law from the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act to Booker both pushed 
quite hard on that understanding.
51421 U.S. at 698.
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Like so many important cases, Mullaney has been read and reread for different 
propositions.  It may be most narrowly understood as holding that true presumptions can never 
operate in favor of the prosecution upon an element of a criminal offense.  Although the case 
certainly stands for that proposition, that understanding of the case sheds no light on how to 
distinguish elements from other factors.  The case may be a bit more broadly understood as 
holding that common law based crimes have elements so deeply rooted in our law that they 
cannot be altered by the legislature or the courts.  As we shall see, that historically based 
rationale offers a way to cabin Mullaney’s reach, but does not provide a broad enough 
understanding to answer the questions posed by subsequent cases.   The case may be most 
broadly understood as establishing the Supreme Court’s authority to review and rule upon the 
substantive adequacy of legislative definitions of criminal offenses and the related legislative or 
judicial doctrines of procedure that govern adjudication under those statutes.   Although that 
third, and broadest reading of Mullaney is consistent with the current state of the law, there 
remains great uncertainty about the standards to be applied in such a review.  The reach of 
Mullaney has ebbed and flowed over time.  In reviving the broader reading of this chestnut,
United States v. Booker is Mullaney’s revenge.
The Court returned to the problem of the interplay between the substantive definition of a 
crime and procedural regulation of proof of the crime in the following term.  Patterson v. New 
York,52 addressed a very similar statute and reached a conclusion hard to square with Mullaney.  
Perhaps more than most Supreme Court cases involving closely related questions, Mullaney and 
Patterson can only be understood as a pair, each limiting the other, with the law in this area very 
52432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
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much dependent on which case is currently dominant.  Just as Mullaney curtailed legislative and 
judicial discretion, Patterson extended it.  
In Patterson, the Supreme Court upheld the recently re-codified and heavily Model Penal 
Code influenced New York homicide statute.53  New York law made all intentional killings the 
highest grade of non-capital murder and permitted the defendant to come forward and prove the 
mitigating defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which reduces the offense to the next lower 
grade of murder.  As many have observed, there is scant difference between the statute 
disapproved in Mullaney and the statute approved in Patterson.  Maine could not shift the burden 
to the defendant by requiring the defendant to prove lack of malice aforethought in order to 
mitigate murder to manslaughter.  New York could, however, define the highest grade of murder 
to include all intentional murders and assign the burden of proof on the affirmative mitigating 
defense to the defendant.  The net effect of the two statutes is the same - intentional murder is the 
highest grade and the defendant has the burden to prove mitigation to manslaughter.  Yet, the 
Maine statute was held to violate the requirement that the state prove each and every element 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, while the New York statute was upheld.
The Patterson majority squared its result with Mullaney by limiting the reach of the 
earlier case.54  Justice White read Mullaney for the narrow proposition that once Maine used the 
language “malice aforethought,” it was committed to that traditional element and could not 
introduce a presumption in favor of the prosecution.55  In this light, the pair of cases sets very 
broad and historically rooted restrictions upon legislative drafting of criminal statutes.  But once 
53432 U.S. at 201 (ruling on New York Penal Law § 125.25 (2004)).
54See 432 U.S. at 214-16. 
55Id.
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Mullaney and Patterson opened the door to Supreme Court review of how legislatures define 
crimes, they could not be so easily cabined.  Although the requirement that an element must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury seemed to provide a very broad field for legislative 
action, changing styles of criminal law legislation would make those boundaries much more 
problematic than they first appeared.     
Reconciling Mullaney and Patterson by limiting Mullaney to the particulars of 
historically rooted, common law statutes may have resolved the immediate problem, but it was 
never an adequate solution.  We might say that although the legislature is free to define new 
crimes, its options are more limited when it uses a well developed, common law scheme.  A 
related political consideration, relevant in 1978, was the Court’s reluctance to strike down a 
strongly Model Penal Code influenced statute during the prime years of Model Penal Code 
influenced re-codification of state codes.56  While each observation has force, neither brings the 
law to a stable rule.  If Mullaney is really limited to common law statutes that have historical 
roots limiting the legislature, how are we to understand Patterson’s language, consistent with 
Mullaney, that “there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go?”57
What are those limits when the legislature drafts outside the common law tradition?  
Justice Powell, in his dissent, foreshadowed this problem.58  He argued that the Patterson
majority vaunted form over substance by giving the legislature the authority to redefine elements 
56The majority opinion recognizes that the statute under review is part of the Model Penal 
Code influenced re-codification movement.  432 U.S. at 207-8, n.10 (discussing the role of 
affirmative defenses in the new New York Penal Law and noting that twenty-two states had 
already reformed their penal laws since the completion of the Model Penal Code in 1962). 
57432 U.S. at 210.
58Id. at 216-232. 
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as affirmative defenses, eviscerating the central protection of our requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which had recently been reaffirmed by In re Winship.59  He argued for a
Winship/Mullaney rule, which would examine whether the fact at issue makes a significant 
difference in punishment and whether it is historically rooted.60  Justice Powell was quite right to 
search for a rule that would ground this area in more than formal drafting requirements.  While 
the standard for which Justice Powell argued captures the difference between Mullaney and 
Patterson, it offers little guidance to a criminal law expanding far beyond its historical common 
law roots.  In the cases that followed, Justice Stevens lead the search for another way to ground 
the question of what is an element, and so must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in more 
than statutory drafting rules rooted in history.  
The jurisprudence of the late 1970 through the late 1980s and the waning of the era of 
proceduralist adjudication and rehabilitative sentencing bequeathed us a vague understanding of 
the term “element.”  The law gave state legislatures great discretion in defining crimes and 
allocating burdens of proof.  For example, state legislators could categorize all intentional 
murders as homicide and give defendants the burden of proof on defenses as traditional and 
deeply rooted as self defense.61  This broad legislative power to define crimes was 
counterbalanced by broad judicial sentencing discretion, and did not, at first, confront the many 
procedural challenges raised by mandatory sentencing schemes.  That would change, but the lack 
of clarity, and underdevelopment of a body of doctrine defining the notion of an “element” of a 
criminal statute remained a central ambiguity in American sentencing law.  Indeed, many of the 
59Id. at 229-32. 
60Id. at 225-27. 
61Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987). 
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sentencing law innovations of the late 1980s and 90s survived because of the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to elaborate a meaningful definition of “element,” and instead to view this area as one 
of largely unfettered legislative discretion.  
Even as the Court reaffirmed its broad approach to the meaning of “elements” in Martin,  
pressure had already begun to build as legislatures stepped away from indeterminate sentencing 
and rehabilitation and began their long effort to limit judicial discretion.  So long as there was a 
clear divide between the extensive procedural protection of trial and the discretionary regime of 
sentencing, the model of Williams was workable, whether or not it was good policy.  As 
legislatures began to enact mandatory sentencing statutes that tied sentencing to fact-finding, 
strains began to appear. 
III. Legislative Discretion Triumphant: McMillan v. Pennsylvania and Sentencing                   
Factors 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,62 the keystone of this line of cases, involved a challenge to a 
Pennsylvania statute that imposed a mandatory minimum of a five year sentence on any person 
convicted of an enumerated felony who the sentencing judge found to have visibly carried a 
firearm during the commission of the crime.  McMillan was the first of the Court’s modern 
sentencing cases to address a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, a style of criminal 
legislation that gained popularity in the 1980s.63  Although the Court analyzed the case in 
doctrinal terms, as it should, the facts of the case bespeak the struggle for control of the criminal 
62477 U.S. 79 (1986).
63For a discussion of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes in federal courts, and the 
ways they change the dynamics of criminal cases, see Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the 
Revolution, supra note 7.
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process.  The Court offered this description of the proceedings after each defendant in these 
consolidated cases was convicted of a qualifying underlying offense: 
In each case, the Commonwealth gave notice that at sentencing it 
would seek to proceed under the Act.  No § 9172 hearing was held, 
however, because each of the sentencing judges before whom 
petitioners appeared found the Act unconstitutional; each imposed 
a lesser sentence than that required by the Act.64
This restrained and technical language described a clash that would be repeated again and again.  
The legislature passed a statute that gave prosecutors new power over sentencing by tying 
punishment to the charging decision through a mandatory minimum.  The sentencing judge 
resisted this diminution in judicial authority occasioned by the contraction of sentencing 
discretion.  Consequently, the appellate courts had to resolve the conflict between the legislators 
and prosecutors on one side, and the judges on the other.  McMillan sided decisively with the 
legislators and prosecutors, through a ruling that revisits the difficult question of the meaning of 
the term ‘element of an offense.’  
The Supreme Court ruled that the Act under review in McMillan created a sentencing 
factor, and did not create a new crime.65  Writing for the Court, then Justice Rehnquist 
acknowledged that the precedents drew no bright line rule between elements and sentencing 
factors.  This, he told us, is a matter of “differences of degree.”66 In a passage distinguishing the 
sentencing factors in the Pennsylvania statute from the burden shifted element in the Maine 
64477 U.S. at 82 (footnote omitted).
65Id.
66Id. at  91. 
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statute ruled unconstitutional in Mullaney, the Court noted:
 “Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime 
committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate 
penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion 
in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it 
without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm.”67
This passage became central to our understanding of the distinction between elements and 
sentencing factors for 18 years, from McMillan through Blakely,68 although the doctrinal tension 
caused by the changing pressures of onrushing events upon this vague standard became evident 
earlier.  As unfettered judicial sentencing discretion gave way to a variety of legislatively 
imposed, reviewable sentencing requirements, our understanding of the phrase “a penalty within 
the range already available to [the court] without the special finding,”69 began to waver and 
change.  
In one light, the essence of the shift that led to Booker was the turn from the McMillan
understanding of element and maximum sentence to our current understanding.  Under 
McMillan, the elements of the crime were the particular facts necessary to determine whether the 
defendant was guilty and so liable for punishment up to the maximum term set by the legislative 
enactment that defined the crime.70  It made no difference whether the sentencing court was 
67Id. at 87-8 (emphasis added). 
68Though, a brief period of uncertainty existed between Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
69477 U.S. at 87-8. 
70McMillan’s understanding of this question was an explicit, although unstated rejection 
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required to give any particular sentence within any range the legislature might establish - factors 
that determined where in the range a defendant was actually sentenced were only sentencing 
factors, not elements, and were only subject to the lesser procedural restrictions of Williams and 
its progeny.  This is the understanding so well argued by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and long articulated by Justices Breyer and 
Kennedy.71  Booker, as we shall see, offered a broader understanding of the maximum sentence 
concept, extending  all rules that establish the enforceable top of the sentencing range.  Of course 
this shift did not occur all at once, and the particular contours of the shift left McMillan standing, 
if greatly limited.  So how did we get from McMillan to Booker?
One key to the shift is found in Justice Stevens’ continued critique of the application of 
Williams style minimalist procedural protections, appropriate to an era of rehabilitation and 
broad judicial discretion, to the world of enforceable Guidelines and retributivist sentencing.72
of Mullaney’s dicta tying the strongest procedural protections to determinations of both guilt or 
innocence and the degree of the crime, and resulting punishment, for which the defendant is 
liable. 
71A series of cases, including Jones, Apprendi, Blakely, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584    
(2002), and Booker shifted and broadened the legal understanding of the concept called                
“statutory maximum” in McMillan and later renamed the concept the “prescribed range                  
of penalties.”   Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, told us that “statutory maximum’ is                
the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in                    
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 121 S. Ct. 21 (2004).  Rejecting the prior                 
rule, defining the statutory maximum as the maximum term set out in the legislative                       
enactment defining the crime, Blakely’s broader definition swept enforceable sentencing              
guidelines into the category of elements for purposes of Winship and Patterson.  
72Viewed in terms of Court politics, the shift may be seen as Justice Scalia’s long term       
movement toward Justice Steven’s position.  Of course Justice Scalia developed his                        
position in the context of orginalism and its historical perspective, while Justice Stevens                
remained ever sensitive to the evolving context of American criminal law and the                           
interplay of shifting substantive law and procedure.  But in the end, Justice Scalia voted                    
with Justice Stevens in Jones, Apprendi and Blakely. 
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Justice Stevens has trenchantly argued that Mullaney and Patterson, properly read, provide the 
tools to identify and rein in legislative excesses.   In his McMillan dissent, Justice Stevens argued 
that there is a more fundamental distinction underneath the apparently formalist rule about 
presumptions in cases involving historically rooted statutes.73  He argued that the cases identify a 
line between aggravating and mitigating factors, capturing an essential legal and political 
difference between facts that increase punishment and those that mitigate punishment.74  Natural 
political limits exist on the legislative transformation of elements into mitigating factors, so they 
need not be constrained in the same way.75  Legislators are unlikely to pass extreme versions of 
“Patterson statutes” - statutes that broadly criminalize conduct and then burden defendants with 
mitigating defenses.76  He offered the example of criminalizing everyone who walks into a bank 
and permitting defendants to prove that they are not bank robbers.77  Such a scheme would face 
intense political opposition.  Although his example was suggestive, recent experience shows he 
may have underestimated the public’s willingness to accept broad criminal statutes.  On the other 
hand, recent efforts to address corporate wrongdoing suggest that there is real political sensitivity 
to extending criminal sanctions to cases in which traditional markers of criminality may be less 
clear.  Whatever the merits of his position on the dangers of overuse of mitigating factors for 
which the defendant has the burden, his argument on the political dangers of aggravating factors 
was powerful.  
73477 U.S. at 99-101. 
74Id. at 100-01. 
75Id. at 100-02. 
76Id. at 101-02. 
77Id. at 100-01. 
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Aggravating factors are quite different, he told us, because there is much less political 
backlash to imposing harsher penalties upon those already convicted of some crime.  The 
experience of the last twenty years shows how politically expedient it can be to expose people 
convicted of any crime to horrendously harsh sentences - opposing those statutes is just being 
“soft on criminals.”  That has been our experience with sentencing factors, which have 
mushroomed since McMillan and unlike mitigating factors, seem to have broader political limits 
than many anticipated.  
The experience of the late 80s and 90s suggests there is a real difference between 
aggravating and mitigating factors, as Justice Stevens argued.  His dissent in McMillan
foreshadowed much of the basic structure of the law today.  He argued for Court scrutiny of the 
process of finding facts that establish the enforceable top of the sentencing range, a requirement 
that characterizes Apprendi and its progeny.78  His views on mitigating factors, have been 
somewhat oddly transformed into a distinct set of rules governing facts that establish the bottom 
of the sentencing range, as in Harris, an opinion from which he dissented.79  But back in 1986, 
Justice Stevens was still in the minority in the sentencing cases and McMillan was the law.  
Legislative power to define crimes and punishments, and to set the procedural requirements for 
criminal adjudication and sentencing, was largely unfettered by meaningful judicial review. 
IV. Legislative Discretion Overreaching: Witte, Watts, Almendarez-Torres and the 
Apparent End of Limits on Legislative Authority to Control Substance and Procedure in 
78Id. at 103. 
79See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (holding that a statute increasing the 
minimum sentence after fact finding by the judge rather than by the jury does not violate a 
defendant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights). 
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Criminal Cases
New questions involving procedural protections at sentencing began to come before the 
Court in the mid 90s, as the federal appellate courts began to sort through the issues presented by 
the new Federal Sentencing Guidelines,80 and the explosion of mandatory minimum and repeat 
offender statutes at both the federal and state levels.81   As the Court began to review the exercise 
of ascendant legislative authority it had encouraged, or at least countenanced in Patterson and 
McMillan, the doctrinal machinations needed to fit the flexible procedures appropriate to an era 
of less aggressive criminal legislation to the enactments of the late 80s and 90s passed from the 
baroque to the rococo.  The devotion to legislative supremacy in criminal law, as embodied in 
Williams, Patterson and McMillan reached, or overreached to, the extreme results of  Witte v. 
United States,82 United States v. Watts,83 and Almendarez-Torres v. United States.84
In Witte, the Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge to a federal prosecution for 
cocaine distribution based on conduct involving cocaine that had already been used as relevant 
conduct under the Guidelines to enhance the defendant’s sentence85 in a prior prosecution for 
80The statutory directive to draft the Guidelines is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2002); 
The Guidelines are set out in the U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2005).  Issues 
involving the application of the Guidelines only began to come before the Court once it rejected 
the initial separation of powers attack on the entire system in   Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361 (1989).
81For discussions of the enthusiasm for legislative sentencing enactments that both 
curtailed judicial discretion and increased sentence severity, see Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years 
After the Federal Sentencing Revolution, supra note 7.
82
 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
83519 U.S. 148 (1997).
84523 U.S. 224 (1998).
85In that earlier case, the government brought a charge of marijuana distribution, although 
the facts involved distribution of both marijuana and cocaine.  When sentencing for the 
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marijuana distribution.86   Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court and relying upon Patterson
and McMillan, argued that the sentencing court in the first case, considering the marijuana 
charge, was not punishing the defendant for the act of distributing cocaine, only for the charged 
offense of marijuana distribution.87   In the course of sentencing for distributing marijuana, the 
sentencing court properly considered his character as a person who had distributed substantial 
amounts of drugs, in deciding how to use its traditional sentencing discretion.88 Only the second 
prosecution punished him for distributing cocaine.  To the extent that he might be punished twice 
in a broad sense, if not in the technical sense of punishment which limits the double jeopardy 
clause, any unfairness was mitigated by the Guidelines treatment of total punishment.89  Justice 
O’Connor drew on both the Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence for a very narrow 
understanding of what it means to “punish” for the instant offense and the broad  McMillan
understanding of what constitutes a traditional sentencing factor, going to the defendant’s 
character.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued the fundamental unfairness of the result, recognized 
that Williams fit the era of judicial discretion, not enforceable Guidelines, continued his critique 
of McMillan, and took issue with the majority’s application of the Guidelines.90  His argument 
began with the straightforward observation that the petitioner in this case was punished for 
marijuana offense, the first sentencing court also considered the cocaine, as relevant conduct 
under Guidelines section U.S.S.G. §1B1.3, Relevant Conduct (2005). 
86Id.
87Id. at 396. 
88Id. at 406. 
89Id. at 404-06. 
90Id. at 407-16. 
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distributing cocaine and then put in jeopardy of punishment again for that same conduct.  He first 
argued that only a formalistic reading of the double jeopardy clause could take this case outside 
its reach.91  He argued that a better understanding of the relationship between double jeopardy 
and sentencing must recognize the traditional distinction between the character of the offender 
and the character of the offense.  He noted that prior convictions considered in criminal history 
are clearly relevant to the defendant’s character and clearly fall under the line of cases carving 
out recidivism as a traditional sentencing factor under McMillan.92   But relevant conduct goes to 
the character of the offense.  In addition, he made the explicit connection between changes in 
sentencing law and the need to reexamine procedural principles when he noted:
[I]n traditional sentencing regimes, it is impossible to determine 
for what purpose the sentencer has relied on the relevant conduct.  
In my view, . . . the Court’s failure to recognize the change in 
sentencing practices caused by the Guidelines, cause it to overlook 
an important and obvious violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.93
Justice Stevens continued, arguing that the limited procedural protections of Williams were set in 
the context of information about the character of the accused, not the character of the offense, 
and did not work in this new era in which statutory provisions make such a strong and explicit 
connection between the character of the offense and the severity of the punishment.  
The dissent then granted that McMillan was the governing law, but that the even in that 
context, the structure of the Guidelines cut against the majority’s approach.94  He noted that 
91Id. at 410.
92Id. at 409-10. 
93Id. at 412.
94Id. at 409-12. 
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under the Guidelines, relevant conduct is an offense characteristic, not an offender 
characteristic.95  Thus, not only as a conceptual matter, but as a matter of the actual Guidelines 
rules, relevant conduct is an offense characteristic under the Guidelines and the defendant was 
being punished for his conduct, not his character, in the first offense, triggering double jeopardy 
protection.96
Although Witte is a double jeopardy case and draws on that line of cases, it is also an 
important sentencing case.  The Court relied, as it must have, on a broad reading of McMillan to 
reach this result.  The result in Witte is only doctrinally consistent if the court continues 
“rejecting the claim that whenever a State links the ‘severity of punishment’ to ‘the presence or 
absence of an identifiable fact’ the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.”97
Only an explicit (and hard to defend) uncoupling of the guilt/innocent line from  the 
determination of the severity of the crime and sentence supports the Court’s claim that, in any 
useful sense, the defendant in Witte was not twice  punished for the same conduct.  If the 
government had been required to twice prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Witte had 
committed the conduct at issue, it is difficult to see how the double jeopardy claim could have 
been denied in any but the most unconvincing manner. 
The Court’s commitment to the broad reading of the Williams message of judicial 
sentencing, and the very real friction between that idea and more than ten years of active 
legislative efforts to cabin that discretion and compel judges to impose uniform and severe 
95Id. at 410-11. 
96Id. at 411. 
97Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
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sentences was well illustrated by the Court’s decision in United States v. Watts.98 Watts was one 
of a pair of cases from the Ninth Circuit in which the defendant went to trial on multiple counts 
and was convicted on some counts but acquitted on others.  In both cases, the sentencing judge 
considered the conduct underlying the acquittals, as relevant conduct under the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Finding that the conduct could be considered as relevant conduct under the 
Guidelines, 99 and was proven by a preponderance of the evidence,100  both sentencing courts 
enhanced the sentences for the convictions to a term within the statutory maximum for the counts 
of conviction but higher than the sentence that would have been imposed without inclusion of the 
relevant conduct. 
In a per curiam opinion granting certiorari and reversing without full briefing, the Court 
sided with all of the other circuit courts and reversed the Ninth Circuit in holding that the 
sentencing courts had acted properly in these two cases.  The Court treated as well settled the 
principle that the procedures governing a judge’s choice of a particular sentence, so long as it 
does not exceed the statutory maximum set by the statute defining the offense, are quite separate 
from and much more relaxed than those that govern the determination of the defendant’s guilt.  
The first paragraph of the opinion closed with, “[b]ecause the panels’ holdings conflict with the 
clear implication of 18 U.S.C. § 3161, the Sentencing Guidelines, and this Court’s decisions, 
98519 U.S. 148 (1997).
99
“Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction 
may enter into the applicable guidelines range.”  U.S.S.G. §1B1.3 comment., backg’d.  With 
respect to certain offenses, such as Putra’s drug conviction, USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2) requires the 
sentencing court to consider “all act and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct 
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.”  Id. at 153.  
100Id. at 149 (noting that an acquittal does preclude relitigating the same issue in a 
subsequent proceeding governed by a lower standard of proof). 
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particularly Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 132 L. Ed 2d 351, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995), we 
grant the petition and reverse in both cases.”101  Walking a path now clear, the Court cited 18 
U.S.C. § 3161,  the statute imposing “no limitation” on the information to be considered at 
sentencing.102
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justice Kennedy, again noted that Williams style 
procedural sentencing discretion means something completely different in the era of enforceable 
Guidelines.  Making an argument which would need a few more years maturing before garnering 
a majority on the Court, Justice Stevens noted that while any information may be considered in 
the exercise of discretion, the Guidelines left only a very narrow range of discretion in the 
decision of what sentence to impose within the applicable Guideline range.  In contrast, all of the 
other judicial sentencing decisions determining the applicable sentence did not deal with 
discretionary choices governed by the principles of § 3161 and Williams.103  Those decisions are 
not left to the judge’s discretion, but are governed by enforceable law and are much closer to the 
line drawn in Mullaney. Mullaney will resurface in this debate to remind us that the substantive 
criminal law, with all of its strong procedural protections, was long concerned with not just 
whether a person was guilty of an offense, but also being correct about what particular offense it 
was so that the correct degree of stigma and punishment would attach.
The Court returned to this question, in a different dress, in Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States,104 the last case in which a majority of the Court accepted the full force of McMillan.105
101Id. at 149.
102Id. (citing § 3161).
103Id. at 162.
104523 U.S. 224 (1998).
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Almendarez-Torres involved a challenge to the illegal reentry statute, which imposed a two year 
maximum on a person who reentered the country without special permission after deportation, 
except that any person deported after conviction of an aggravated felony was subject to a twenty 
year mandatory minimum.106   The defendant was charged with illegal reentry in an indictment 
which did not charge that the defendant had been deported after conviction of an aggravated 
felony.107  The Pre-sentence Report noted the defendant’s eligibility for an enhanced sentence.  
The defendant objected that the statutory maximum was limited to two years, given the language 
of the indictment, the facts to which he admitted and the omission of his waiver of his right to 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the fact of his previous conviction of an aggravated felony.  
The judge imposed a sentence of eighty-five months. 108  The defendant appealed and the Court 
affirmed the sentence.109
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that the 
aggravated felony requirement was a sentencing factor, not an element.110   The Court began its 
analysis by trying to determine Congress’ intent, staying true to McMillan’s central teaching that 
105The continued vitality of Almendarez-Torres is in doubt.  The reach of the case was 
narrowed by Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005) (strictly limiting the information 
judges may consider in determining whether a prior conviction is sufficient to enhance a 
sentence).  Justice Thomas has also repeatedly observed that since he announced he has changed 
his view and would overrule Almendarez-Torres, a majority of the Court no longer supports the 
rule.  See his concurrence in Shepard.  See id. at 1264.
106523 U.S. at 224 (reviewing 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)).
107Id. at 226-27. 
108Id. at 227. 
109Id. at 248.
110Id. at 226-27. 
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the legislature is free to define crimes as it chooses within very broad constitutional limits.111
After  close analysis of the statutory language, the Court concluded that Congress intended the 
section to operate as a sentencing factor, not an element.112  After finding that the legislature 
intended to create a sentencing enhancement and not an element, the Court went on to consider 
whether there was a constitutional infirmity in that choice.  
The Court first considered whether Mullaney and Patterson limit legislative power in this 
case and the opinion emphasized how weak the limiting principle of Mullaney had become when 
it observed:
At most, petitioner might read all these cases, taken together, for 
the broad proposition that sometimes the Constitution does require 
(though sometimes it does not require) the State to treat a 
sentencing factor as an element.  But we do not see how they can 
help petitioner more than that.113
The Court then considered McMillan, the case “upon which petitioner must rely.”114
Applying the five factor test of McMillan, and emphasizing that recidivism is the classic 
sentencing factor, the Court noted that this statute is just like the statute in McMillan in four of 
the five dimensions discussed in the earlier case.115  As in McMillan, i) there was no express 
violation of the limits set out in Patterson, as the government did not enjoy a presumption of a 
long established and central element of a common law crime, ii) the defendant did not face a 
differential in sentencing ranging from a fine to life in prison, as was the case with the Maine 
111Id. at 228-35. 
112Id. at 235. 
113Id. at  242 (emphasis in the original).  
114Id.
115Id. at 242-46. 
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statute rejected in Mullaney, iii) the statute did not create a separate offense and, iv) the statute 
“gave no impression” that it was intended to make the enhancement the tail that wagged the dog, 
but only gave precision to a traditional sentencing factor.116
The high water mark of the strong uncoupling of liability from severity and the strongest 
application of Williams to the changed world of McMillan and legislative assertion of power 
comes in the analysis of the fifth McMillan factor in Almendarez-Torrez as the Court stepped 
over the statutory maximum line, the last clear limiting principle.  The Court concluded that 
although the statute in this case did raise the maximum sentence specified by the legislative 
enactment defining the crime, they have not and would not adopt a bright line rule “that any 
significant increase in a statutory maximum sentence would trigger a Constitutional “elements” 
requirement.”117  The majority’s treatment of the statutory maximum in Almendarez-Torres
marked the apogee of Patterson’s legislative discretion model.  The analysis revolved around 
discerning legislative intent.  The Court discussed the idea of constitutional limitations on 
legislative power late, little and lightly.  Perhaps those who can read tea leaves could see 
significance in the fact that Justice Scalia authored a dissent arguing for a pullback from the 
Court’s support for virtually unfettered legislative discretion.  Justice Scalia first argued that 
McMillan should be read to set a real and substantial limit on legislative discretion, requiring that 
116Id. at 243-46. 
117Id. at 247.  The opinion went on to note that it would be anomalous to establish a 
bright line rule about the statutory maximum in light of the fact that a judge could 
constitutionally  make factual findings rendering a defendant eligible for a death sentence.  Id. at 
247.  Of course that rule would not survive the great shift that was about to occur, as Apprendi 
was followed by Ring. 
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facts resulting in a sentence above the statutory maximum be treated as elements.118  The dissent 
then went on to critique the notion that recidivism is different from other sentencing factors and 
only then addresses the question of statutory interpretation.  It would not be too long before a 
majority of the Court would be willing to impose real limitations upon legislative discretion to 
define crimes, reasserting the role of the jury that undergirds a broader reading of Mullaney and 
reopening space for judicial discretion in the era of detailed legislative criminal statutes. 
V. Mullaney’s Revenge: Jones, Apprendi and the Reassertion of Limitations on the                   
Legislature
Unless you stand far out on the mud flats at First Encounter Beach on Cape Cod, it can be 
very hard to identify the moment when the tide starts to run in again.  And even when you can 
see it running in, some of the tidal pools continue draining for a while.  Sometime between the
Court’s decision in Witte, when the tide was running out fast against limits on legislative control 
of criminal  law, and Jones, when the tide was clearly running back, there was a shift.  Looking 
back, it seems that a bit of distance from the crack epidemic of the early 90s and the real and 
significant decrease in crime in America coupled with a growing sense that new policing and 
security approaches really worked combined to create space in public debate for examination of 
questions like the growing evidence of wrongful convictions in the death penalty arena and the 
human and financial costs of harsh, mandatory sentencing.  Few of us saw it as it was happening, 
but the one way ratchet slowed, even if it did not reverse.   
118Id. at 253. Importantly, Justice Scalia carefully distinguished mandatory minimums 
from maximums. 
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The significance of the next case in this line, Jones v. United States,119 is obvious in 
hindsight.  However, at the time, it seemed to many to be just a small step back on the long 
march to legislative discretion to define crimes and set punishments with ever increasing 
specificity.  Jones involved a challenge to the federal carjacking statute,120  which carried a 
maximum sentence of fifteen years in the ordinary case, but permitted a sentence up to twenty-
five years if there was a finding of serious bodily injury.  Jones was tried on an indictment that 
did not plead serious bodily injury, convicted by a jury and then sentenced to twenty-five years 
after the trial judge found the requisite enhancing fact of injury, by a preponderance of the 
evidence.121
This sentence could have been affirmed, perhaps per curiam, with reliance on Witte, 
Watts and Almendarez Torrez, but it was not.  Justice Souter, now in the majority with Justices 
Scalia, Ginsburg and Stevens, with the other dissenters in Almendarez-Torres, joined here by 
Justice Thomas, turns first to the question of legislative intent.  Although the Court found that 
mode of analysis sufficient to decide Almendarez-Torrez, here it is inconclusive.122   The 
majority expressed an inclination toward the view that Congress intended to define a separate 
crime and so made serious bodily injury an element, rather than a sentencing factor.  But the 
Court recognized “the possibility of the other view,”123 and in the face of that uncertainty, read 
the statute to avoid declaring it unconstitutional.   Although the Court might have stopped there 
119526 U.S. 227 (1999).
12018 U.S.C. § 2119.
121526 U.S. at 230-31. 
122Id. at 233. 
123Id.
-41-
and treated Almendarez-Torres and Jones as only a pair of constitutional doubt cases, presenting 
a less ambiguous statute in Almendarez-Torres and a more ambiguous, but still constitutional 
statute in Jones, it did not. 124  This apparent deference to the legislature set up the larger 
constitutional question of what limits the Court would impose as the majority went on to breathe 
new life into Mullaney.
Taking a strikingly different analytic tack from the mid 90s cases discussed above, the 
Jones opinion went on to discuss the fundamental division of authority between judge and jury 
under the Sixth Amendment, revived the McMillan formulation of the statutory maximum as the 
limit above which a mere sentencing factor may not further enhance a sentence and clearly 
limited Almendarez-Torres to cases in which recidivism is the enhancing factor.125  The holding 
that the car jacking statute created two separate crimes and that serious bodily injury must be 
pled and proven to the jury proved the turning point in the Supreme Court’s contemporary 
sentencing cases.   
As is so often the case as the Court takes incremental steps, the complicated relationships 
among the boundaries of legislative power, judicial power, prosecutorial power and the role of 
the jury are only partially explored in Jones.  The analysis of the jury’s historical role and the 
explicit focus on balance between judge and jury marked an important shift in analysis, away 
from statutory construction and discussions of legislative intent and toward the constitutional 
limits on legislative discretion.  That shift in analysis would become more pronounced in 
124See id. at 248-49. 
125See id. at 251-52. 
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Apprendi and Blakely.126 What remained unstated in Jones, but surfaced quite clearly in Blakely, 
was discussion of the twenty  year shift from indeterminate sentencing to detailed sentencing 
statutes and Guidelines.  In a system dominated by guilty pleas, the apparent doctrinal shift of 
authority from judge to jury (expanding the range of elements and so apparently diminishing the 
judicial role), was really a shift in power back to judges and away from a twenty  year rise in 
legislative and prosecutorial power to set punishment. 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Jones gestured in the direction of the systemic impact and 
potential disruption to which the underlying reasoning of Jones could, and eventually did, 
lead.127  First analyzing the statutory language for evidence of Congressional intent, the dissent 
argued that the statute creates only a sentencing factor.128  The dissent then went on to argue that 
Almendarez-Torres should have been understood as reaching more broadly and cementing the 
broad view of legislative discretion to define crimes.129  Raising the flag of formalism first flown 
in this debate by Justice Powell in his dissent in Patterson, Justice Kennedy noted that the 
majority would have had Congress simply raise the statutory maximum to life, changing a few 
words to get the same result.130 In many respects, Jones left us back in the world of 
Mullaney and Patterson.  After Patterson, it seemed there were some limits to legislative 
authority to define crimes.  It appeared that those powers were broad, but the contours of the 
discretion were uncertain.  McMillan gave us broad discretion, seemingly limited by the 
126See 530 U.S. 466 (2000); 121 S. Ct. 21 (2004). 
127526 U.S. at 254. 
128Id. at 256. 
129See id. at 266-71. 
130Id. at 267.
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statutory maximum in the legislative enactment defining the crime.  Then Almendarez-Torres
suggested that even the statutory maximum was not a clear limit.  These were the doctrinal 
underpinnings of detailed statutory sentencing provisions and enforceable Guidelines. 
Jones signaled a change in direction, but left open the real possibility that the Court 
would continue to set very broad limits and might leave much of contemporary sentencing 
undisturbed.  The Court was willing to impose some limits on legislative discretion to define 
crimes and sentences, although like Mullaney, the first case to set limits, its reach was unclear.  It 
seemed possible that Jones would have its Patterson, a follow up case that would limit Jones to 
its very particular setting and reaffirm the late 20th Century sentencing world of Williams style 
minimalist procedural requirements in the era of enforceable Guidelines.  Instead, we got 
Apprendi.    
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, positioned Apprendi as flowing from and 
foreshadowed by Jones.131 Apprendi involved the New Jersey assault statute, which carried a ten 
year statutory maximum, but permitted a sentence of up to twenty years if the assault was 
racially motivated.132   The judge sentenced the defendant to twelve years, although the finding 
of racial bias was made by the judge, under a preponderance of the evidence standard.133  The 
Court offered an extended, historically based discussion of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial and emphasized the special role statutory maxima play in our system.134  The opinion then 
131530 U.S. at 476.   Apprendi also flowed from Justice Stevens’ dissents in McMillan, 
Witte and Watts and the clear echoes of those dissents in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Almendarez-
Torres. 
132Id. at 468-69 (referring to N.J. Stat Ann. § 2C:4-3(e) (West 2000)). 
133Id. at 471. 
134Id. at 476-83. 
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set out a rule that did not use the language “statutory maximum,” but the broader phrase 
“prescribed range of penalties.”  The Court told us:
. . . [with the prior offense exception] we endorse the statement of the rule 
set forth in the concurring opinion[s] [of] . . . [Jones].   “It is 
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment 
of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal 
defendant is exposed.  It is equally clear that such facts must be 
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”135
The battle lines have now shifted.  The question was no longer whether statutory maxima offered 
a bright line rule, but whether other kinds of limits, most notably Guidelines, fell within the 
ambit of “the prescribed range of penalties.”
Justice O’Connor’s dissent took on the historical analysis of the majority and argued that 
the rule announced in Apprendi effectively overrules McMillan, without admitting that it did so 
or justifying the departure from stare decisis.136  Although one may quibble with the 
characterization that McMillan was overruled, no doubt exists that Apprendi was profoundly 
unsympathetic to the McMillan approach, which eschewed bright line rules in this area and 
supported broad legislative discretion to define crimes and punishment.  Justice Breyer made the 
point more plainly in his dissent, arguing that Apprendi upset the settled understanding on the 
division of sentencing authority and cast grave doubt on modern sentencing.137  His dissent also 
asked whether juries can engage in the detailed fact-finding required by enforceable Guidelines, 
raising questions about two parts of the triangular relationship among juries, judges and 
135Id. at 490.
136Id. at 476-85. 
137Id. at 564-66. 
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legislatures (and those legislative surrogates in this context, the prosecutors).138
VI.  One Step Back and the Final Leap Forward: Harris, Blakely and Booker
Although Apprendi was clearly a very significant case, it was followed by an opinion that 
could have limited it, as Patterson limited Mullaney.  Harris v. United States139 posed a challenge 
to the mandatory sentencing provision of 18 U.S.C. §924(c), which imposes a minimum seven 
year term upon anyone convicted of a crime of violence or a narcotics trafficking offense who 
brandishes a weapon during the commission of that offense.  The defendant argued that the 
statute created a separate crime which was not submitted to the jury for proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and thus violated Jones.140  The defendant also argued that the statute increased 
the prescribed range of penalties and violated Apprendi.141
The majority, made up of the Jones dissenters and Justice Scalia, breathed new life into 
McMillan, which also involved a mandatory minimum sentence for use of a gun in the 
commission of another crime.  In a decision that may be read as carefully distinguishing the 
precedents and applying stare decisis, or as using a bit of formalism to revive the letter if not the 
spirit of a discredited case, the Court ruled that section 924(c) was a sentencing factor under 
McMillan, not an element under Apprendi.142  The doctrinal key to Harris is the distinction 
between juries finding facts that set the maximum penalty, and judges finding facts that establish 
138Id. at 557.
139536 U.S. 545 (2002).
140Id. at 551. 
141Id.
142Id. at 556-57. 
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the bottom of a sentencing range. 
Justice Thomas, in dissent and joined by the remaining three of the Jones majority, 
Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, argued that the logic and language of Apprendi cannot 
and should not be squared with McMillan.143  He relied, with some justification, on the argument 
that the language “facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties,” embraces mandatory 
minimums, as well as the maximum,144 as a range of five years to life is, in common 
understanding, an increase in the range of penalties over a range of zero years to life.  Justice 
Thomas notes that “before today, no one seriously believed that the Court’s earlier decision in 
McMillan could coexist with the logical implications of the Court’s later decisions in Apprendi
and Jones.”145  But Harris revived the possibility that legislative discretion to define crimes and 
to allocate and limit judicial sentencing authority, sufficient to sustain most enforceable 
guidelines systems,  could survive.  After Harris, it seemed possible that the Court would walk 
the line, requiring that statutory maximum altering facts go to juries and all, or some subset of 
other enhancing facts, could remain with the judge.  But Blakely v. Washington erased many of 
those questions.  
Famously, at least within the world of sentencing law, Blakely brought the top of the 
range in enforceable sentencing guidelines systems within the ambit of Jones and Apprendi.  
Once the door closed on the meaning and scope of the phrase “facts that increase the prescribed 
range of penalties,” the major hope to save the Federal Guidelines was the argument that they 
were not statutes, but some other form of law that did not fall within the rule first promulgated 
143Id. at 572. 
144Id. at 578. 
145Id. at 582. 
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by Mullaney.  But that argument did not garner five votes on the Supreme Court.  Booker
followed directly from Blakely and, by that point, the interesting and hard questions were 
remedial, not doctrinal.
VII.  Conclusion
The road from Mullaney to Booker took us far into the land of unlimited legislative 
discretion and back.  It started in an era characterized by fewer, less specific criminal statutes 
which relied upon judicial discretion and indeterminate sentencing to apply those broader rules 
to the vast array of cases that came before the courts.  Procedural protections mattered less in that 
system because sentences turned on individual judgements, not the application of rules.  The 
system had little need to examine the limits of legislative power, as the legislature was not 
inclined to approach, let alone push upon, the limits it had long observed.
By the late 1980s, the whole interdependent system began to shift dramatically.  As 
legislators began to define crimes and set punishment with ever greater specificity, sentencing 
procedures began to matter a great deal and the bounds of legislative and judicial power became 
contested.  Although the doctrinal questions played out in the right to a jury trial, our reliance 
upon guilty pleas has turned jury power into judicial power, at least for now.  The politicization 
of criminal justice in the 1980s and the strong assertion of legislative dominance in criminal 
justice that developed in response to that politicization were the underlying forces that pushed 
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these issues forward.  In what may be a healthy exercise in correcting power imbalances among 
the branches of our government, the Court circled back around to renewed concern with the 
limits of legislative power as the issues took on a very different cast in the world of mandatory 
minimums and enforceable Guidelines.
At each turn in the direction of the Court’s limit setting on  legislative discretion, 
Patterson and Jones, the dissent argued that either the majority’s failure  to limit legislative 
authority or the majority’s excessive limitation upon legislative authority is a retreat into mere 
formalism - the legislature can always find a way to write the statute to achieve its desired result 
within the bounds of the Court’s requirement.  This captures the current reality.  Whether we 
think about “topless guidelines” or a system of very lengthy and detailed statutes setting out a 
wide array of mandatory sentences for very specific offenses, drafting alternatives exist to return 
us to much of pre-Booker sentencing in the post-Booker worlds.
Predictions about the future of criminal sentencing in America have lately been frequent 
and frequently wrong.  As a theoretical matter, there is great appeal in the call for the Supreme 
Court to engage in more regulation of the substantive criminal law.  As William Stuntz has 
argued, the Court could construct a system of procedural limits with real bite on substantive 
criminal statutes, creating an updated version of common-law court lawmaking and couple it 
with revived judicial sentencing authority.146  This would insulate our criminal law from the 
danger of politicization of criminal justice, which I have argued is at the root of the stresses and 
146See Stuntz, supra note 3 (suggesting Constitutional regulation of the                 
substantive criminal law as one way to escape the problems of over-criminalization and    
excessive prosecutorial power brought on by the politicization of American criminal justice 
policy). 
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excesses of the last twenty years.  
Short of that major change, perhaps we must recognize that there is very likely to be a 
degree of formalism in any solution the Court offers to these problems.  In our system of 
multiple criminal law codes and coordinate branches of government, it may well be impossible 
to find a substantive solution that will provide stable lines defining the reach of each branch, 
especially assuming each branch continues to push on the line.  Perhaps Justice Stevens was right 
to look to self limiting principles in the long term politics of criminal law.  In his analysis of the 
difference between aggravating and mitigating factors, he noted the natural limits on turning 
elements into mitigating factors - at some point too much innocent conduct is swept in and 
people are unwilling to have many defendants forced to prove their innocence. 
But aggravators are different, as their harm is limited to an already despised class, 
convicted criminals.  While Justice Stevens is right and the Court must step in to protect the 
rights of defendants, it may also be true that even aggravating factors have an upper political 
limit.   At some point, the creation of too many aggravating factors creates clear enough 
substantive injustice to merit public attention.  The continued development of enhanced and 
mandatory penalties has become a clear cause of injustice in America as the public learns of 
more and more sentences that simply do not fit the crime. 
The history of this period is still to be lived and written.  But if it turns out that the tide of 
sentence severity and politicization of criminal justice has turned, then we will have reached the 
political limits of enhancing sentences through legislative domination of our criminal law.  That 
would offer the best hope of a more workable and stable long term solution.  If each branch and 
player in our system would stop trying to expand his or her power by pressing aggressively on 
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the edges of the law, the fundamental limits of the doctrines would not matter so much.  We 
would stop running up against the limits of the law - after all the law itself cannot make us good, 
it can only help us to be good if we are so inclined.   
